Miles Lorraine Miller and Irvine B. Miller v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., Executor of the Last Will and Testament of Nettie Knudsen Miller, Deceased, and Viola Miller Carlson : Appellant\u27s Brief by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1965
Miles Lorraine Miller and Irvine B. Miller v. Walker
Bank & Trust Co., Executor of the Last Will and
Testament of Nettie Knudsen Miller, Deceased,
and Viola Miller Carlson : Appellant's Brief
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.James W. Beless, Jr.; Attorney for Appellant
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Miller v. Walker Bank, No. 10272 (1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3516
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the -
STA TE OF UTAH 
MILES LORRAINE MILLER and 
IRVINE B. MILLER, . 
Plailntitfs and Respqndents, 
vs. 
'/I 
)I ' ! 
\ 
Case, 
No.( ,I WALKER 13ANK & TRUST CO., 
Executor of the Last ,Will and .. -
Testament of NETTIE KNUDSEN .9~· 
MILLER, Deceased, .and vioµA .. · 
MILLER CARLSON, , f 
' ,.10272 ' ' 
! r . i'- .- , ,n, :,_._.',r'·'U ·. ,':-\,'- - I' 
Defend~ts ~ Appello;n,ts. ' r EB. l i, 1965 
----~~.._,,,,... ( \ ,.' i, v '( ll ! l 
/ ----------··---·--···-~•--••- .. ·-·-U---···"'-·--~~ ·f \ APPELL~TS' · BRIE:Ft>!~ri., ~11w•mu ~urt; w.ii ,, · 1• 
- • 
1 
.\,, : • , i·-., , ,_ ',-, I '\ 
APPEALFROM:AJUDGMENTOFTHE' · l 11 
TIDRD DISTRICT COURT toR 
1 
'· '1 
S:AL·T LAK~ COUN'l'Y , . , 1 <' i., '\ . ., 
HONORABLE A. !¥: '.ID~LET[',,,JUD<JE .. 1, i\, 
) ~ 
r I - ' .1 
JAMES w. B_EL~S, JR.' ' _ ,.r ~ '. _I ( I j_ (' 
416 Kearns Buildfiig · _ '.c -1 , _. _ 
-Salt L __ ake Ci,ty, u __ tah~84~1 ''!fl ' ';~ ' I - \ . 
Attorney for J)ef e , Of. ,V'f ~ 
•O!Klil Appellants . · · , . - . 
VANCOT1T, BAGLEY, CORNWAL ., . · , ~- ~ 1gec.·, \, · 
& McCARTHY ~iU J. ~J 
141 East 1st South ' " --
Salt Lake City, Utab.84111 '- ~ 
· Attorneys for Plaintiffs . .. ~ 1 1 - · i 
o;n,d Respondents ' _ \ . : ' -· 
I 1- .,.1 
I. --
'l'ABLE UF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE _ __ _ _ ---------------------- 1 
UISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ______ --------------------------------- 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL _________________ ---------------------------- 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS _ ______ _______________ _____________ _____________________ 3 
ARGUMENT 
I. The probate decree of distribution properly con-
strued the will and gave to Nettie Miller an un-
qualified fee simple interest. __ ------------------------------------- 6 
II. The decree of distribution was complete, certain, 
unambiguous and final and allowed no reference 
back to the wi'll for interpretation. -------------·-------------- 14 
III. The 1956 decree of distribution was final and may 
not now be col1aterally attacked or reviewed. ____________ 17 
CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 20 
AUTHORITIES 1CITED 
CASES 
Auerbach v. Samuels, 10 Utah 2d 152, 349 P.2d 1112. ___________ 16, 18 
Ballenger v. Ba'llenger, 208 Ala. 147, 94 So. 127 ________________________ 11 
Bank of America, N.T. & N.A. v. Hennelly, 102 Cal. App. 2d 
750, 228 P.2d 76 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 16 
Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574, 106 P. 522 ____________________________ 17 
Bills v. Bills, 77 Iowa 179, 45 N.W. 748 ____________________________________ 10 
In re Brook's Estate, 83 Utah 506, 30 P.2d 1065 ---------------------- 19 
In re Cali's Estate, 15 Utah 2d 1, 386 P.2d 125____________________________ 6 
In re Dewey's Estate, 45 Utah 98, 143 P. 124 ____________________________ 13 
Erickson v. McCullough, 91 Utah 159, 63 P.2d 595, 109 
A.L.R. 332 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17 
In re Evans, 42 Utah 282, 130 P. 217 _____________________ --------------------- 19 
In re Ewer's Estate, 170 Cal. 660, 171 P. 683 ____________________________ 15 
In re Ferdun's Estate, 91 Cal. App. 622, 205 P.2d 45'6 ____________ 10 
In re Haney',s Estate, 174 Cal. App. 2d 1, 344 P.2d 16 ____________ 15 
In re Hayward Estate, 57 Ariz. 51, 110 P.2d 956________________________ 9 
Hewey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 100 Me. 523, 62 At!. 600 __ 11 
Kalb v. German Savings & Loan Society, 25 Wash. 349, 65 P. 
557 ----- ---------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------- 18 
Keating v. Smith, 154 CaL 186, 97 P. 300_____ _ --------------- ------- -- 16 
Lee v. Harvey, 195 Olda. 178, 156 P.2d 134_ ---------- _ - ----------- 18 
In re Latsis Estate, 3 Utah 2d 365, 284 P.2d 479 ________________ 16, 19 
In re Linford's Estate, 121 Utah 113, 239 P. 2d 200 __________________ 18 
In re Loring's Estate, 29 Cal. 2d 423, 175 P.2d 524 ___ - -- -- -- 15 
In re Miller's Estate, 132 Minn. 316, 156 N.W. 349________ 14 
Nelson v. Howells, 75 Utah 461, 286 P. 63L _____________ ------- _16, 18 
'l'ABLE OF CON'l'I£NT~ 
Page 
Newhal1l v. McGill, 69 Ariz. 259, 212 P.2d 764.. .... . . . 10 
In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah 128, 158 P. 705.. 18 
In re Rice Estate, 111 Utah 428, 182 P.2d llL 19 
In re Ryan's Estate, 170 Cal. 660, 171 P. 683.... _ ... . 15 
Schomp v. Brown, 215 Ore. 714, 335 P. 2d 847 _______ _ 
Schuster Estate, 137 Cal. App. 125, 289 P. 2d 847. 
Shipley v. Jordan, 206 Cal. 439, 274 P. 745 __________________ ........ 15 
In re Shira's Estate, 82 Ohio Law Abs. 307, 165 N.E. 2d 60 .. 7,8 
Snyder v. Murdock, 26 Utah 233, 73 P. 22____ _ _ 19 
Tiller v. Norton, 123 Utah 42, 253 P.2d 618_____________ ____ _ _ 19 
Trask v. Walker's Estate, 100 Vt. 51, 134 At!. 853 ________ ... .19, 20 
In Re Wallace's Estate, 98 Cal. App. 285, 219 P.2d 910 ......... 15 
Weyant v. Utah Savings & Trust Company, 54 Utah 181, 
182 P. 189 .... _ ____________ _ _______ --·----- __ _______________________ __ 18 
STATUTES, TEXTS AND TREATISES 
19 Am. Jur., Estates, 575, Sec. 120 .... -----------------------------
30A Am. Jur., Judgments, 762, Sec. 844 _________ .... _ _ 17 
30A Am. Jur., Judgments, 774, Sec. 858 ............ ------- .. _____ 18 
57 Am. Jur., Wills 795, Sec. 1209 ............ ----------------------- . 12 
Annotation 136 A.L.R. 1183 ........................ -----···----------------· _ .... 19 
4 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills, p. 647 ------------·------·--. .7, 9 
4 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills, p. 65'2 ....... -------------·-·-·--- 9 
34 C.J.S. 453, Sec. 529 (a) ______________ ·---------------------· ________ . 14 
96 C.J.S. 231, Sec. 802 ........ ------------------------··-·----·--·----··----- 10 
1 Underhill on Law of Wills, Sec. 358 ..... ·----------------- 8 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 
74-1-36 --------·-···-------·--·----------------------------------··--------·---- 7,8 
7 4-2-1 --··----····-------·· --·----------·-----·' ···--·········-------------·----· 
7 4-2-9 ---.. ------- -- ---- --------- ---- -- --------- ---------· ---------- ----·-· --- --- ---- -----· ..... 
75-1-7 ---·-------------------------------·--------·-----------------------------------·--······· 17 
~~~i1~3·7·:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::·:::J 7 , :~ 
75-12-9 ---------------·······-----------···--------------------------------------------·-······ 18 
75-14-12 ----------------------------------------------------------------------·--············· :: 
75-14-15 ------------------------- ----------·--------------------- ------------------------·. 11 
41 Words & Phrases, 17..... --------------------- ---- -------------- -·-· -· -- ···· 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
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JlILLER, Deceased, and VIOLA 
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Case 
No. 
10272 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
rrhis \\'as a suit to quiet title, whereby the plaintiffs 
and n•spondents sought a construction of a will to give 
plaintiffs a remainder interest or a b~neficial interest 
under a trust, following a life interest in defendants' 
predecessor. Tlw defendants and appellants counter-
claimed, contending that an unqualified fee interest in 
CTPf<>ndants' predecessor was created by the will and con-
firmed by the decree of distribution. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiffs and dPfendants both moved for summan 
judgment. The court granted plaintiffs' motion, holdin~ 
that plaintiffs were each owners of an undivided om 
quarter interest in the real property in question and 
denied defendants' motion. 
RJDLIEF SOFGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants and appellants seek reversal of tl1e 
judgment, ·with det(~rmination that the will created an 
unqualified fee simple interest, with neither trust limita-
tions on the fee nor remainder interests in plaintiffs. 
STATE.MENT OF FACTS 
Miles E. Miller died May 29, 1956, leaving a will dateJ 
March 20, 1941 (R. 45, 46), which was admitted to 
probate in Salt Lake County. The entire probate file, 
No. 38583 is included in this record ( R. 44). 
Miles Miller's heirs were his widow, Nettie, and 
three children by a prior marriage, Lorraine and Irvine 
Miller, the plaintiffs and respondents, and Viola Carlson, 
defendant and appellant. Nettie was married to Miles 
in 1921 (R. 32). Zola Miller Smith, Miles' fourth child 
and Viola's twin, predeceased Miles, dying in 1954 (R. 
23). All of Miles' children were under 12 years of age 
when Miles married Nettie (R. 32), and Nettie raised 
these children. The three surviving children were ages 
44 to 49 in 1956. 
Miles' will namPd Nettie as his executrix and rnarle 
one donative provision, namely: 
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"SECOND. I give, devise and bequeath to my 
beloved wife, Nettie Knudsen Miller, all of my 
prnperty, whether the same be real or personal 
or mixed, and I do this acknowledging all my 
l'hildn'n hereinafter named, and for the reason 
that I know that my beloved wife will, care for 
lllY children from the remainder of my estate, if 
th(•J'(' IH· an:-·, slian• and share alike; MilPs Lor-
raine Miller, son; Irvine Bagley Miller, son; 
Viola Miller Carlsen, daughter; Zola Miller Smith, 
daughter; all n'sidents of the State of Utah" 
(R. 45). 
Notice was given in the probate to the widow and 
the thrcP surviving children, being plaintiffs Lorraine 
and [rvinP Miller and defendant Viola Carlson. Miles' 
Pstatc eonsisted entirely of one parcel of real property, 
a four-plex in Salt Lake County, which was appraised 
at $34,000. R~- Deeree of Distribution dated September 
27, 1956, Miles' estate \\-as distributed, the decree pro-
viding as follows: 
"NOVl THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY OR-
DERED ADJUDGED AND DECRgED as 
' follows: 
l. That in accordance with the Last Will and 
'l'estament of deceased the entire rest, residue and 
remainder of the estate of Miles Edward Miller, 
also known as Miles E. Miller, deceased, is dis-
tributed and set over to Nettie Knudsen Miller. 
Said property consists of the following: 
Real property located at 2630 to 2650 South 
~nd I1Jast, Salt Lake C'onnty, State of lTtah, 
and more particularly described as follows: 
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(legal de:,;cription) 
2. All pro1wrty of dPC('USL'd hereafter dis 
covered or not now known he, and the :,;ame is 
hereby set ovPr, distributed and transferred to 
Nettie Knudsen Millt>r" (R. 17). 
Nettie improvPd and rent Pd tltP fonr-1) lex and used 
all income for her own purpost's to her death on May 
17, 19G--t (R. 3:J). XdtiP left a will, naming dPfendant 
Walkt'r Bank & 'l'rust Company as Executor, and after 
making certain s1wcific bequests, she gavP, devised and 
bequeathed the entire remainder of her estate to her 
step-daughtPr, def<>ndant Viola Carlson, who had cared 
for and nursed Nettie during the last three years of her 
life. \Valker Bank & Trust Co. is presently acting as 
the E~xecutor of Nettie's estate and is managing thr four. 
plex property in question (R. 9). 
The complaint of plaintiffs Lorraine and Irvine 
Miller (R. 1-3) sought to quiet title to the four-plex 
property, alleging that 1\Iiles ·Miller had "devised his 
real estate to his widow for her use and maintenance 
during her lifetime, tlw remainde1· to be divided at her 
death among his four childn,'n, share and shan· alih" 
(R. 1), and that plaintiffs are each the owner of a one· 
fourth undivided interest in fee si11111le in said proper~· 
and are entitled to joint possession with defendant 
Viola Carlson and the heirs of Zola Smith, dt>~ea~\·il. 
Plaintiffs did not qrn·stion the decree of distribution. 
but conceded that distrihution was "in accordancr with 
said last will and testament" (R. 2). 
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DPl'l·mlanb answered and eounter-daimed allPgino· 
' 0 
that 1tndl'r tht• residual provision of Miles' will an un-
,1ualifi1•d fe1• simph-- interest was devised to Nettie and 
that th<' D1•neP of Distribution of September 27 1956 
' ' 
in distri huting the entire n•siduP to X ettie made the 
n·:-;iduar~· dPvis1-- res judieata, final and impervious to 
plaintiffa' collatPral attack (R. 8-11). 
Dt'f<'ndants and plaintiffs filed motions for sum-
mar)' judgu1ent which were heard on the basis of the 
affidavits of Yiola Carlson (R. 23) and Grant H. Bagley 
(H. ;);2, ;);3), the .Mil PS :Miller probate file (R. 44) and the 
~Jiles .Mill(--r will (R. 45, 46). 
At th<· hParing before Judge Fmett, counsel for plain-
tiffs arguPd that an implied trust for the benefit of 
~Jiles' <'hildren was created by the language of the will 
which followPd the residuary provision. Defendants 
eontended that :Miles' will in giving the entire residue to 
~dtiP c·reated in her an unqualified fee simple interest, 
that thP simple rPf erence to the will in the decree of 
distribution showed only that Miles died testate, but did 
not allow ref erenct• back to the precatory words of the 
will to qualify the fee, and that after 8 years the probate 
<lecreP was final and not subject to collateral attack. 
The judgment (R. 37-39) denied defendants' motion, 
granted plaintiffs' motion and adjudged that plaintiffs 
were owners in fee simple title of an undivided one-quar-
tn interest each in the four-plex propPrty, and that plain-
tiffs, defendant Viola Carlson and the children of Zola 
Rmith, deceased, per stirpes were entitled to possession 
of :;;aid real property as tenants in common. 
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ARG-Ul\H!JNT 
POINT I. 
THE PROBATE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION PROPER-
LY CONSTRUED THE WILL AND GAVE TO NETTIE MIL-
LER AN UNQUALIFIED FEE Sil\IPLE INTEREST. 
If any fnrth<'l' t·orn-;trudion of l\lilt;s nl illPr\ 11ilJ 
can be made at this latt• date, an examination of Para-
gra1)h Second (R. -1:5) clearly shows the work of a frugal 
draftsman, who combined three separate provisions in 
one paragraph, nnd in fad in om· compound sentence. 'l'he 
first part is the entire residuary provision, stating, "I 
give, devise and bequeath to my beloved wife, Nettie 
Knudsen l\1iller, all of my property, ·whether the same be 
rE:al or personal or mixed, ... " Next is stated the 
necessary acknowledgment of Miles' children, as follows: 
"and I do this acknowledging all my children hereinafter 
named, ... " And finally, there is the added expression 
of hope and confidence, ''and for the reason that I kn01r 
that my beloved wife will, care for my children from 
the remainder of my estate, if there he any, share and 
share alike: l\Iiles Lorraine l\1mer, son; Irvine Bagley 
Miller, son; Viola Miller Carlsen, daughter; Zola Mi!IPr 
Smith, daughter; all residents of the State of Ftah." 
This court has clearly answered any question as to 
the proper construction of the Miller will by its decision 
in Jn re Gall's Estate, 15 Utah 2d 1, 386 P.2d 125. The 
Call v.rill devised the residue in one provision, then in 
subsequent language prm.rided that the residue should 
go to other beneficiaries on the deaths of the first d.e-
• • 1n visees. The court held that when the estate is given 
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fel'. ::;imple absolute in one clause, "the interest so devised 
eannot he taken away or diminished by any subsequent 
provisions of doubtful import, or by any inferences de-
dnctibl<' therefrom repugnant to the estate given." (Em-
phasi::; added.) The court gave emphasis to the fact 
that the entire rest, residue and remainder of that testa-
trix' estate was given and devised, stating: 
''Such language certainly expresses an inten-
tion of the testatrix that a fee simple title to her 
property be conveyed to the children upon her 
death. This paragraph of the will is controlling 
unless it clearly appears from other provisions 
that the testatrix intended to convey a lesser 
estate." 
The court cited 74-1-36 UCA 1953, which provides: 
''74-1-36. Devise Conveys All of Testator's 
Interest. Every devise of land in any will conveys 
all the estate of the devisor therein which he could 
lawfully devise, unless it clearly appears by the 
will that he intended to convey a less estate." 
The court showed that it was not unmindful of 74-2-9 
HCA 1953, which provides that all provisions of a will 
should be given effect, if possible, and also 74-2-1 UCA 
1953, which generally provides that the testator's in-
tPntion "must have effect as far as possible," and cited 
are Schamp v. Brown, 215 Ore. 714, 335 P.2d 847, In re 
8hira's Estate, 82 Ohio Law Abs. 307, 165 N.E.2d 60, and 
.J, Ho ire-Parker: Page 011 Wills, p. 647. 
Schamp v. Brown involved reciprocal husband and 
wifr will::;, with a provision for the rP::;idm' to go to the 
'lll\'iving spouse. Following was a provision that the 
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survivor would be bound not to change the share which 
children would ultimately receive by the reciprocal will. 
The Oregon court held: 
"It is a well-recognized rule that when an e~­
tate in an absolute fee is given in one clause of a 
will, as in Article IV here, the interest which the 
devisee then obtains cannot be taken away or 
diminished by any subsequent or general expres 
sions of doubtful import, or by any inference de 
ductible therefrom that may be repugnant to the 
estate given." 
Cited is 1 Underhill on Law of Wills, Sec. 33S, and an 
Oregon statute which is almost identical in language 
to our 74-1-36 UCA 1953. 
In re Shim's Estate distinguished situations where 
(1) remainders were clearly created, with or without 
powers of disposal or use in the first taker, and (2) the 
situation created hy the J\liller will, where tlwre i' a 
devise to A generally, with no power of disposal ex· 
pressed or with an absolute power but followed by a 
devise to B of what shall remain undisposed of at A'1 
death. In the latter situation, tlw Ohio court held that 
A takes a fee simple and that the attempted limitation 
over is impossible and void. The court said: 
"The testator is, in effect, attempting to make 
a will for the first devisee, to take effect in case 
the first devisee fails to make one for himself, or 
otherwise disposes of the property. This the test· 
at w cannot do ... A fre once given, cannot be 
cut down by other provisions of the will. A re· 
mainder cannot be engrafted on a fee." 
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+ Bu we-Parker: Page un Willi;, lJ. 647, states the 
rule: 
"If words creating a fee are clear, it will not 
he cut down to a lesser estate by words which 
are vague or from which an intention to cut down 
the fee can be drawn only by inference." 
4 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills, p. 652, states: 
"Where testator devises realty to one, with 
suggestions as to its ultimate disposition by de-
visee, which are not mandatory, and which do not 
amount to a precatory trust, the devisee takes a 
fee simple." Cited are In re Hayward Estate, 
57 Ariz. 51, 110 P.2d 956, and Schuster Estate, 137 
Cal. App. 125, 289 P.2d 847. 
The Hayward case involved the (ollowing language 
after an absolute devise: "My wish is that my estate be 
kept within my descendants." These were held to be 
precatory words only and were not testamentary, and 
the Arizona court quoted the general rule from 19 Am. 
Jur. 575, Sec. 120: 
"Where there is in an absolute devise of prop-
erty, a subsequent clause expressing a wish, desire 
or direction for its disposition after death of 
devisee or legatee will not def eat the devise or 
limit the estate in the property to a right to pos-
session or use during the life of the devisee, but 
rather the absolute devise stands and the other 
clause is to be regarded as presenting precatory 
language." 
In the Schuster case, the testator gave the residue 
to the beneficiary with the provision that he should "dis-
tribute as he deems wisest." This bequest was held not 
10 
to creak a trust or to limit the outright and absolut~ 
character of the bequest. 
In Newhall v. McGill, 69 Ar ii. 259, 212 P.2d 7G4, t)11• 
court held that where the testator named his sister as 
executrix and devised pro1wrty to her "to be cared for 
and disposed of according to my personal directions to 
her," the quoted words were merely precatory, that the 
devise was in foe and not in trust, and that mere preca. 
tory words will not create a trust. 
In re Ferdun'::; },'state, 91 Cal. App. G22, 205 P.~cl 
±56, involved a will with the following language: "11Jwn-
thing I mrn to John. Kerp the vinyard as long as you 
live and at the time of your death, you leave it to 
Ernest." The court held that this did not create a trust; 
that then• must be imperative language - not \\islws. 
hopes or precatory words. 
The general rule is stated in 96 C.J.S. 231, Sec. 802, 
as follows: "Broadly speaking, an t>state or interest de-
vised or bequeathed by will is neither enlarged nor l'l'-
duced by subsequent language unless there is a clearly t'\ 
pressed intent to do so." Cited is Bills v. Bills, 77 Iowa 
179, 45 N.vV. HS, as tlw leading case, with the rule therr 
restated: 
"When there is an absolute or unlimited de-
vise or bequest of property, a subsequent clm'.sf' 
expressing a wish, desire or direction for its dif'-
position after the death of the devisee or leg~te;. 
will not def Pat the devise or bequest, nor ]Innt 
the estate or interest in thl' property to the right 
to possession and use during the life of the de-
11 
vist~e or legatee. The absolute devise or bequest 
stands, and the other clause must be regarded 
as presenting precatory language. The will must 
be interpreted to invest in the devisee or legatee 
the fee simple title of the land, and the absolute 
property in the subject of the bequest." 
'l'he language of the Miles Miller residuary bequest 
and devise was clear in giving all interest of the testator 
to his wife. It was followed by the statement that the 
testator did have four named children and that the devise 
was made acknowledging that fact. If any emphasis of 
the fact of a devise of an absolute fee interest was nec-
P~sary, tlw testator gave such by those added words. 
ThP language which follows the devise at best ex-
pre:oses Miles' wish or hope. He said: "I know that my 
beloved wife will care for my children from the remain-
der of my estate, if there be any, share and ska.re alike ... " 
Each of the italicized words or phrases actually creates 
an ambiguity from which could be taken different mean-
ings, if any one of those words or phrases required an 
exact construction. 
"/ know" certainly indicates a wish, feeling of con-
fidence, desire or direction, but not a mandate, and cer-
tanly nothing to create a remainder or a beneficial in-
terest under a trust. "Will care for" normally means to 
support, maintain or physically take care of someone 
on a current day to day basis. See 41 Words and Phrases 
17. In Hewey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 100 Me. 523, 
G~ Atl. 600, "care" was defined as "responsibility or over-
~ight, watchful regard and attention." In Ballenger v. 
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Ballenger, 208 Ala. 1±7, 9-1 ~o. 127, "take care of" wa, 
construed to mean "to support, maintain, feed and clothe, 
look after, attention in sickness." To give the phrase 
"will care for" any other meaning in the vernacular would 
only compound the confusion and emphasize the uncer 
tainty of all of tlw language following the devise of the 
fee. 
A will speaks as of, or takes effect only upon the 
death of the testator; however, for purposes of testa-
mentary interpretation the will must be considered with 
reference to th1:~ circumstances existing at the time of 
execution. 57 Am. Jiir. 795, Sec. 1209. "From the rr 
mainder of my estate, if there be any," can only mean 
that Miles had in mind all of his estate in 1941 and includ-
ing property owned by him then but not in 1956 at hii 
death, and not just the one parcel of real property now 
in question. This again shows an expression of hope and 
wish. "Share and share alike" refers to the four of Mil~i 
children alive in 1941, all of whom were then adults (R 
23). Zola Smith died in 1954, predeceasing Miles by t111• 
years. No provision is made for Zola's chil<ln'n. Thi, 
phrase and its legal ap1Jlication can add only more un· 
certainty as to the wishful thinking of the testator and th1• 
legal effect of that language, if it should be considered ai 
a qualification of a fee interest previously given to Nettie 
The respondents indicated in their complaint that 
they assumed that a life estate was given to Nettie witli 
remainder interests in the children (R. 1, 2). At the 
hearing before the District Court the respondents argued 
that the will created an implied trust with Nettie being 
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thl· truskl'. HPspondents' failurP to eonsistantly hold 
to mw tltPory for eonstruction of these words is itself 
proof of the nneertaint;· and amhiguity of the language. 
Bd'on· .Judge I•~llett thP respondt•nts argued for a 
l'onstrnetion of an implied trust, relying on Jn re Dewey's 
f,'..;fafr, -l:G i ·tah 9~, 143 P. 1:24, in arriving at l\liles' in-
h·nt. Tlw Dncey case involved a direct appeal from a 
i'ontest in pro hat<' n•garding distrihution. Jn the Dewey 
1rill tlw te;;tator gave clear instruction to one 'l'uttle to 
<fo:trilrnh· and sprinkle the residue among certain per-
sons, and it provided a specific separate bequest for 
Tuttle, whieh gave further n•ason for the court's finding 
of a trust in thP residue. There was no ambiguity and on 
thP contrary a mandate for distribution. 
'I:'he instant judgment (R. 37-39) would seem to 
follow the theory of a life estate with remainders, as it 
giws l\I il<•;;' d<'<'PasPd daughter';;; childn-'n remainder in-
terests. 
The language following the clear devise of a fee 
simple absolute expressed only l\Iiles' general wishes. 
It is ambiguous and uncertain. It cannot subtract from 
the fee clt•arly devisPd by thP prior and separate pro-
vision. 'I'lw intention of the testator, <'Xpressed in 1941, 
was patently a <kvise in frp simplP ahsohite, followed 
b;: wishes and sentiment:-:. )Jo construdion of ~1 iles' will 
should now lw allowed which would trnd<• a c·Prtainty for a 
doubt. 
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POINT II. 
THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION WAS COMPLETE, 
CERTAIN, UNAMBIGUOUS AND FINAL AND ALLOWED 
NO REFERENCE BACK TO THE WILL FOR INTERPRE. 
TATION. 
The respondents seem to avoid considering their 
present suit to quiet title m; any attack on the DPr·rr1 
of Distribution entered September 27, 1956. No fraud, 
lack of jurisdiction, or other matter going to the valid. 
ity of the decree was alleged, and in fact, respondenb 
alleged in Paragraph 4 of their complaint that distribu. 
tion in Miles' estate was made "in accordance with thr 
will" (R 2). They argued before Judge Ellett that thi~ 
phrase in the decree of distribution was incorporation by 
reference of the will into the decree. 
A very general rule is set out at 34 C.J.S. 453, Sec, 
529(a), that a decree of distribution is subject to inter 
pretation when its language is vague, uncertain or ambig 
uous; however, 
"An absolute and unequivocal final decrei• 
of distribution is not made ambiguous by a recital 
that the distribution is according to the will, and 
where the final decree of distribution necessarili 
construes the will and is not ambiguous or mad~ 
subject to the will, the will cannot be resorted to 
in order to modify or affect it." 
In re Miller's Estate, 132 Minn. 316, 156 N.W. 349, 
cited by C.J.S., held: 
"In the case of the estate of a testate the fina! 
decree of distribution of the probate court neces· 
sarilv construes the will in distributing the estate, 
and ·unless made subject to the provisions of the 
will' or unless ambiguous or uncertain on its face, 
tlw will may not be resorted to for the purpose of 
modifying or affecting the decree. 
"A final decree of distribution which in abso-
lutP and unequivocal terms has assigned the whole 
Pstatc to one person is not affected with uncertain-
t>· or ambiguity by a n~cital that the distribution 
is in accordancP with the tPrms of the will." 
'l'lw California court in h1 re Wallace's E:;tate, 98 
('al. App. 285, :219 P.2d 910, stated: 
"A plain and unambiguous provision in the 
dt-cree of distribution, once the decree has become 
final, cannot under the doctrine of res judicata, be 
impaired or contradicte>d by a reference to the 
will, even if incorporated in the decree by way 
of recital." 
See also Shipley v. Jordan, 206 Cal. 439, 274 P. 745. 
The rule appears to be clear that the decree of dis-
tribution, where it is clear and unequivocal, is final and 
may not lw impeached by reference back to the will, even 
if the decn'P is erroneous, except on appeal. In re Ryan's 
Rstate, 96 Cal. App. 2d 7&7, 216 P.2d 497; In re Haney's 
Estate, 17+ Cal. App. 2d 1, 344 P.2d 16; In re Loring's 
Estate, :29 Cal.2d 423, 175 P.2d 524. 
In In re Ewer's Estate, 170 Cal. 660, 171 P. 683, 
reference in the decree of distribution was made to the 
will by the language "in accordance with the last will," 
and the court lwld the decree to be impervious to attack, 
thP <lPcree to prevail owr the will, and the quoted langu-
age not to make any possible incorporation by reference 
to allow further construction of the will. 
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Our court in Nelson v. llrncells, 75 lltah 461, 286P. 
631, has held that a will is interpreted by the probate 
decree of distribution and that it is not subject to a dif. 
ferent interpretation on a collateral attack. In AiterbacJ
1 
v. Samuels, 10 Utah 2d 152, 349 P.2d 1112, tlw drcrl'r 
recited that administration and distribution was "in ac 
cordance with the testator's will," and further intt>rpreta-
tion after the final decree was not allowed. Se<> also /11 
re Latsis Estate, 3 Utah 2d 3G5, 284 P.2d 479, regardinr 
finality of the decree ·when clear on its face. 
Appellants submit that the Decree of Distribution of 
September 27, 1956 was clear and unequivocal in stating: 
"1. That in accordance with the Last Will 
and Testament of deceased, the entire rest, residue 
and remainder of the estate of ]\files Edward 
Miller, also known as Miles E. Miller, deceased, is 
distributed and set over to Nettie Knudsen Mil-
ler." 
No possible ambiguity or uncertainty existed on thP 
face of the decree. The reference to the will was a recital 
to show that Miller died testate. It is not an incorpora 
ti on by reference under the general rule and cases refer 
red to above, and the decree in its absolute form muil 
prevail over any other possible construction of the will 
The decree, unappealed from, was final and concluded 
the rights of all parties interested under the will. Tllf 
will merged into the decree. All parties' interests there· 
after are measured by the decree and not the will. Ser 
Keating v. Smith, 154- Cal. 186, 97 P. 300; Bank of Awr 
. ' ')d ""50 •)ryQ ica, N.T. & N.A. v. Hennelly, 102 Cal. App. ~ I , ~-
P.2d 76. 
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POINT III. 
THE 1956 DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION WAS FINAL 
AND !\TAY NOT NOW BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED OR 
REVIEWED. 
73-1-7 tTCA 1953 rnakPs prohah~ deert>es final and con-
clusive, wlwre tht> court had jurisdiction and after proper 
notif'e appointed tlw executor, and after time for appeal. 
75-1-8 PCA 1953 specifically prohibits impeachment of 
such final decret>s by eollateral attack. 
Respondents conceded in Paragra])h -! of their 
complaint (R. 2) that the will of :~.files Miller "was duly 
admitted to probate in th0 above entitled court and the 
real estate above particularly described was thereafter 
distributed by said court in accordance with said last 
will and testament." No fraud of any kind, lack of 
jurisdiction or other matter going to the validity of the 
decree was alleged by respondents, and thus, respondents' 
suit to quiet title is in no way a direct attack in equity 
on the decree. 
30A Ani. Jur. 762, Sec. 844, states the general rule 
that: 
"A judgment is not subject to collateral at-
tack where the court had ;jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter and the parties or, in a proceeding in 
rem, of the res." Cited is Erickson v. McCullough, 
91Utah159, 63 P.2d 595, 109 A.L.R. 332. 
Probate matters are in rem. Where jurisdiction is 
properly acquired and the respondents have conceded 
this, the only remedy from a decree in probate is by 
appeal or attack for extrinsic fraud. Barrette v. Whit-
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11ey, 3fi Utah 57-t, lOfi P. 52:2, 37 L.RA. ( N:::l) :-ms: 1Ve 11 
ant v. Utah Savings & Trust Co., 5-1- rtah 181, 182 P. 
189. 
30A Am. Jur. 77-1-, Sec. 858, statPs that a suit tri 
quiet title is a collateral attack on a judgment, where thr 
suit is an impeachment of the rights in property created 
by the judgment, citing Kalb v. German Savings & Loan 
Society, 25 "\Vash. 349, 65 P. 557, and Lee 1:. Ilan;e11. 
195 Okla. 178, 156 P.2d 134. 
Other sections of the probate code, namely, 75-11-37, 
75-12-9, 75-14-12 and 75-14-15 UCA 1953, provide for tlw 
finality and conclusiveness of probate decrees. These 
sections were cited and construed by our court in Auer 
bach v. Samuels, supra, which held: 
"Upon the basis of the notices the plaintifff 
were charged with knowledge of the probate pro 
ceeding and under a duty to assert any claims 
they had or be concluded by the decrees entered 
The authorities quite uniformly agree that this 
applies to rights devolving upon the interpreta-
tion of the terms of the will; and this is so even 
though at a later time the decree may be regar~ed 
as not in conformity with the correct constructwn 
thereof." 
Nelson v. Howells, supra, held that the probatP 
decree is the interpretation of the will, and the conclu 
siveness of probate final accounts and decrees, in absensr 
of fraud has been determined by our court in construing 
75-11-37 'UCA 1953 in In re Linford' s Estate, 121 Utah 
113, 239 P.2d 200; In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah e~. 
19 
lfJS P. 705; In r(' Bruuk's Estate, 83 l'tah 506, 30 P.2d 
1 OGf>. 1'h(' rule was restated by our court in In re Rice 
[~'state. I 11 Utah -l-28, 182 P.2d 111, as follows: 
''A decree of distribution in probate proceed-
ings after due and legal notice, by a court having 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, is conclusive 
as to the fund, property, items and matters cover-
ed hy and properly included within the decree, 
until set aside or modified by the court entering 
the decree in the manner prescribed by law, or 
until reversed on appeal." 
See also In re Evans, 42 Utah 282, 130 P. 217. 
75-1-8 UCA 1953 was referred to in In re Latsis 
Estate, supra, where it was determined that an uncon-
ditional decree finally closed the probate proceedings and 
settled the rights of the parties interested in the prop-
erty involved, the decree demanding the respect to which 
a final decree is entitled under that statute. Tiller v. 
Norto11, 123 Utah 42, 253 P.2d 618, impressed in the 
law the finality of the probate decree. See also Sn;yder 
v. ftfordock, 26 Utah 233, 73 P. 22. 
Trask v. Walker's Estate, 100 Vt. 51, 134 Atl. 853, 
and Nelsou v. Howells, supra, are both citt->d in the A11-
1wtatio11 at 136 .A.L.R. 1183 entitled "Rule of Res .Judi-
cata as Applied to Judicial Construction of Wills." The 
Trask case involved a will with a devise of the residue 
to the wife of the testator, an acknowledgment of testa-
tor's children, and language indicating that the wife 
should have the use and disposition of the residuary 
rstatP. The plaintiffs, as the respondents here, claimed 
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that the wife took only a life estate, with remainders in 
plaintiffs. The Vermont court held that this was a devise 
of a fee to the wife; that the decree of distribution was 
a construction of the will by the probate court; and that 
where no appeal was taken, the property vested in fee 
in the wife, and the decree could not subsequently be 
attacked. The Trask case nicely sums up the whole ar 
gument of appellants. 
CON CL URION 
Appellants submit that Miles Miller's will created 
an unqualified fee simple interest in Nettie. The 1950 
decree of dstribution by clear, unequivocal language gave 
to and confirmed in Nettie that unqualified fee interest. 
That decree was the interpretation of the will. The de-
cree was unconditional and final and not subject tu 
collateral attack. 
The judgment givmg interests to respondents a.-
remaindermen or trust beneficiaries should be reversed. 
and the fee interest in Nettie Miller should be confirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES W. BELE8S, JR. 
416 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendants and 
respondents 
